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Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta, Indonesia 
Abstract: This paper sheds some light on Indonesian Shi‘a 
sympathizers, their particular relations among themselves 
as well as with others. Following the Iranian Revolution by 
the late 1970, Indonesian Muslims witnessed a remarkable 
religious enthusiasm marked by the proliferation of Shi‘a 
literature. This, in turn, is followed by the establishment of 
Shi‘a- based institutions, Islamic schools, publishers and 
associations over the regions. However, in a Sunni> majority 
country like Indonesia, the identity of Shi‘a sympathizers is 
contested by various religious inclinations among 
themselves as well as with Indonesian Sunni>s. Due to 
strong suspicion from the Sunni>s, the outward appearance 
of Indonesian Shi‘i identity is not as visible as the Sunni>s. It 
goes without saying that public discourse disappears. Some 
efforts to communicate with broader scope of Indonesian 
Muslims have been made by Shi‘a sympathizers, especially 
among new generations, in order to strengthen their 
community as well as carry out a more open and 
productive dialog with the Sunni >s.  
Keywords: Shi‘a, Muslim minority, and Indonesian Islam.  
Introduction 
A study center called “The Iranian Corner” has just recently been 
set up in a number of Indonesian universities. Providing a bunch of 
                                                     
1 The earlier version of this paper was presented at the American Muslim Social 
Scientists/ AMSS 34th Annual Conference “Muslim and Islam in the Chaotic Modern 
World: Relation Muslims among Themselves and with Others,” which was co-
sponsored by Temple University, Philadelphia-Pennsylvania in 30 September - 2 
October 2005. I would like to thank Prof. Mahmoud Ayoub and other anonymous 
reviewers for their valuable comments. 
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literature and information pertaining to Iran, this “corner” has 
increasingly become a window for Indonesian students to have a look 
at contemporary Iranian culture, including its religious tradition and 
political system. The availability of Islamic literature written by Iranian 
scholars at the Iranian Corner is also believed to have contributed to 
the development of students’ knowledge on Shi‘a tradition. Some 
works are written in Arabic, Persian, and English; but the rest are in 
translation (Bahasa Indonesia). All those literature are supplied by the 
embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Jakarta through Islamic 
Cultural Center (ICC). Dr. Behrooz Kamaluandi, the Ambassador of 
Islamic Republic of Iran in Jakarta also actively visits universities 
across the regions and gives lectures on domestic and international 
issues relating to Iran. A number of universities such as Indonesia 
University (UI), Islamic State University (UIN) in Jakarta and 
Yogyakarta, Gadjah Mada University, Hasanuddin University in South 
Celebes, as well as Muhammadiyah Universities in Jakarta, Malang, and 
Yogyakarta have great respect for setting up such a study center at 
their own universities as the Iranian Corner has also become a medium 
for those universities to carry out further cooperation with the Islamic 
Republic (I.R) of Iran in education and human resources development. 
Following this, Iranian government, for example, sent a number of 
students and lecturers from Indonesia to take a coursework in one of 
Iranian universities. The embassy of I.R. of Iran in Jakarta also brought 
some Iranian thinkers, academia, and public intellectuals to the listed 
universities above with the aim of facilitating ‘cultural exchange’ and 
making dialogue with local academia. It goes without saying that strong 
suspicion from particular Muslim leaders in the country disappears. As 
a matter of fact some consider that the Iranian Corner is nothing but 
simply concealing a hidden agenda, propagating the Shi‘a tenets among 
university students. 
The Iranian Corner is certainly not the only access to Shi‘a 
literature. Since the early 1980s several works written by prominent 
Iranian Muslim scholars have been translated into Bahasa Indonesia 
and publicly available in many bookstores. The spread of Shi‘a 
literature and the thought of Iranian modern Muslim scholars for the 
last three decades reveal that there was a renewed interest in the Shi‘a 
tradition among Indonesian Muslims whose religious stance is Shafi‘ia-
Ash‘a>ria in character. There is no precise survey that has been done as 
for the number of Shi‘is in the region. One claims that their 
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population numbers in the country reach three million people. The 
increasing number of literatures, publishers, associations or 
foundations that very much deal with Shi‘a tradition also indicates that 
Indonesian Muslims who either secretly or publicly adhere to Shi‘a also 
increased. It is by no means certain that the Shi‘i communities and 
sympathizers could visibly and freely express their identity in public 
life, as other Sunni> Muslims do, given that strong resistance to Shi‘a 
tradition from certain groups of Sunni > Muslim mainstream remains. 
Keeping the above situation in mind, this article will explore the extent 
to which Shi‘a sympathizers in Indonesia negotiate their identity with 
Sunni > majority tradition. In particular it shall deal with the nature of 
Indonesian Shi‘a sympathizers in Indonesia and the rise of Shi‘a-
inspired institutions subsequent to the Iranian Revolution. This also 
will analyze the contested meanings of being Shi‘i among the new 
‘converts’ and how it generates reaction especially from the Sunni> 
purists. 
Defining Indonesian Shi‘a Sympathizers 
The generic term of Shi‘a appeared after the death of Prophet 
Muhammad in 7th century A.D., which is in turn followed by the 
dispute among early Muslims over the rightful leader of Islamic 
community. The advocates of Ali bin Abi Thalib, which is latter on 
called the Shi‘a ‘Ali (the faction of Ali), maintained that Ali, with his 
spiritual virtues, deserved to be a rightful leader succeeding the 
leadership of the Prophet Muhammad. They denied recognizing the 
leadership of another faction led by Abu Bakr as-Siddiq that de facto 
became the first caliph in Islamic history. ‘Umar Ibn al-Khaththab and 
‘Usman bin ‘Affan, the successors of Abu Bakar, are also politically 
beyond Shi‘a recognition. The advocates of Abu Bakr and his 
successors are associated with Sunni> Muslims or Ahl al Sunnah wa al-
Jama>‘ah (“the People of Tradition and the Community”), the largest 
faction in Islam. Most of Sunni > Muslims consider that Ali bin Abi 
Thalib is the forth caliph and included in the so-called “the Rightly 
Guided Caliphs” (al-khulafa>’ al-ra >shidu>n). The story continues when 
both factions develop their respective theological foundation and 
tradition, and these two opposing communities finally spread 
throughout the world. On the matter of leadership in Islamic 
community, the Sunni > scholars develop the concept of khila>fa, while 
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the Shi‘a ulama formulate that of ima>ma.2 Shi‘is are heavily 
characterized by devotional love to the prophet Muhammad and his 
descendants from Fatima’s blood line. Fatima is prophet’s daughter 
who became the wife of Ali bin Abi Thalib.3  
The Shi‘a communities exist in many countries notably, Iran, Iraq, 
Lebanon, India, and other parts of the world, including in Southeast 
Asia. In particular, the Indonesian Islam is overwhelmingly Sunni >, and 
only few Indonesians adhere to Shi‘a Islam.4 There are at least two 
strains of the so-called Shi‘a Muslims in the Indonesian context: those 
                                                     
2 Relevant accounts from Indonesian Muslim scholars to this issue, see for example, 
Nurcholish Madjid, “Skisme dalam Islam: Tinjauan Singkat secara Kristis-Historis 
terhadap Proses Dini Perpecahan Sosial-Keagamaan Islam,” and Jalaluddin Rahmat, 
Skisme dalam Islam: Sebuah Telaah Ulang,” in Budhy Munawwar Rahman (ed.), 
Kotekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), pp. 668-688; 692-
706.    
3 It is by no means that, in the Indonesian context, those propagating devotional love 
to the prophet Muhammad and ahl bayt (“the Prophet’s family”) can by definition be 
labeled Shi‘a since there are also some other groups among Muslims have high respect 
for Prophets’ family and his progeny. Traditionalist Muslims’ custom to some extent 
resembles Shi‘a tradition in a way that they often carry out a sort of religious festival in 
which they adore honoring ahl bayt. See for example Baroroh Baried, L'Islam Dans l-
Archipel, Archipel (1978), issue 15, pp. 65-84; for a comparison see recent research 
conducted by Suharti, “Tabuik: Ritual Kepanatikan ‘Kaum Syi’ah di Pantai Barat 
Sumatra Barat,” (Unpublished research report, Sekolah Tinggi Seni Indonesia, Padang 
Panjang, 2006); and Mazir Mozaffari-Falarti, “Critical Studies of Theories Surrounding 
the Historic Arrival of a Popular Shi‘ite Festival in Contemporary Sunni Malaysia,” 
(Paper presented to the Conference “Social Change in the 21st Century,” Center for 
Social Change Research, Queensland University of Technology, 29 October 2004).  
4 Some works have dealt with the coming of Shi‘a to Malay-Indonesian Peninsula, 
asserting that Shi‘a community arrived in the Archipelago by seventh and eight 
centuries. This community ruled Perlak Kingdom in the Aceh Area after defeating the 
Sunni>s. See for example A. Hasjmy, Syi’ah dan Ahlusunnah Saling Berebut Pengaruh dan 
Kekuasaan Sejak Awal Sejarah Islam di Kepulauan Nusantara (Surabaya: Bina Ilmu, 1984). 
However, there is, according to Azyumardi Azra, unfortunately no adequate evidence 
that supports this claim. Azyumardi Azra, “Islamic Thought: Theory, Concept, and 
Doctrines in the Context of Southeast Asian Islam,” in K.S. Nathan 7 Muhammad 
Hashim Kamali (eds.), Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 
21st Century (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), pp. 8-9. Another account connects the 
emergence of Shi‘ia with the coming of Tarekat ‘Alawiya to Indonesia-Malay 
Archipelago. It is suspected that some of the Tarekat ‘Alawiya’s members secretly 
adhere to Shi‘a. For further discussion see Syed Farid Alatas, “The Tariqat al-‘Alawiya 
and the Emergence of Shi‘i School in Indonesian and Malaysia,” International Workshop 
on South-East Asian Studies. No. 12, The Arab in Southeast Asia (1879-1990) (Leiden: 
Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology).  
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Sunni >s who converted to Shi‘a, and those who become admirers of the 
Shi‘a following the Islamic Revolution. In this regards, Azra points out 
that it is hard to discover the Sunni> Muslims who by definition 
converted to Shi‘a. For him, the enthusiasm of limited groups of 
Indonesian Muslims to travel to Iran seeking knowledge of Shi‘ite 
Islamic tradition does not indicate a sort of massive scale of 
“conversion”. However, Azra and other observers seem to agree that 
the Iranian Revolution has had a great impact on the growth of interest 
in Shi‘a tradition among Sunni > Muslims.5 It is also worth mentioning 
that for most Indonesian Muslim activists and students, admiration for 
Islamic Revolution in Iran does not necessarily lead them to self-
conversion to Shi‘a, except among few Arab descendants. Rather, they 
attempted to draw a more fundamental meaning of such a revolution, 
which is how to reframe revolutionary concept in Islamic tradition and 
reconstruct it in the Indonesian social and political environment.6 
Another account points out that by the end of century (2000 and 
afterwards), the numbers of Shi‘a converts reach tens of thousands. 
Concerning the typical Indonesian Shi‘is, Martin Van Bruinessen 
explains, “some of these are converts in the full sense of the word, 
many others sympathizers and admirers of the Shi`a.”7 Being Shi‘is in 
“the full sense of the word” or simply being a Shi‘a sympathizer has 
become a choice for limited groups of Indonesian Muslims. Based on 
the above accounts, the Shi‘a Muslims this paper will much refer to are 
recent Shi‘i converts or Shi‘a sympathizers whose levels of devotional 
love to Muhammad, Ali bin Abi Thalib, Fatima and their progeny vary 
in quality. 
There are different kinds of Shi‘a sects: the largest group is called 
Twelvers Shi‘a (Ithna> ‘Ashariya). This group has strong followers 
primarily in Iran and Iraq. Next to it are Zaidiya and Isma‘iliya. The 
former has strong supporters in Yaman, while the latter in some areas 
of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Most of the recent converts to Shi‘a 
in Indonesia are “Twelver,” and very limited numbers of Isma’iliya, 
                                                     
5 Azra, “Islamic Thought,” pp. 8-9.    
6 Yudi Latif, Intelegensia Muslim dan Kuasa (Bandung: Mizan, 2005), p. 549.  
7 Martin Van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Soeharto 
Indonesia, Southeast Asia Research, Vol. 10, no. 2 (2002), pp. 117-154. 
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such as Boria, exist in Surabaya-East Java.8 The feature of Indonesian 
Shi‘a quite differs in character from the ones existing in the Middle 
Eastern countries. Whereas Shi‘a communities in Middle East have 
very long history of bitter experience of domination—and very much 
coped with strong oppression—of Sunni> Muslims, the Indonesian 
Shi‘is are mostly recent converts whose sociological or political role is 
not as imperative as in the Middle East or South Asia. Likewise, in 
Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei 
Darussalam where the majority of population is Sunni >, the Shi‘a groups 
have been treated rather differently. “Whereas the Shi‘ites are relatively 
free in Indonesia, they face a great deal of difficulties in other countries 
in Southeast Asia. In both Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia, Shi‘sm is 
regarded as a deviant teaching and, therefore, the governments in the 
two countries keep a watchful eye on Shi‘a and its possible spread.”9 It 
is worth pointing out, however, that whereas the government allows 
Indonesian people to adhere to one of the ‘recognized’ religions, 
radicalization among limited groups of Indonesian Sunni >s have 
contributed a great deal to the rise of communal tension in public 
realms between the majority (Sunni>s) and Muslim minority groups 
(Shi‘is and other small sects).  
The spread of Shi‘a teaching in contemporary Indonesia is not 
always associated with the Iranian Revolution or with Muslim activists 
and university students in urban areas. It, in some cases, also deals with 
local Muslim ulama, mostly Arab descents, who from the beginning 
might surreptitiously have adhered to Shi‘a tradition. There are some 
key figures in the Shi‘a communities that play pivotal roles in the 
spread of Shi‘ite tradition in both rural and urban areas; among them 
Abdul Qadir Bafagih, Husein al-Habsyi, Jalaluddin Rahmat, Umar 
Shahab and others. Having been involved in Shi‘a tradition, the above 
figures played their respective roles in the area where the live in. 
Bafagih, is very known to have introduced Shi‘a tradition in Jepara-
West-Java. Supported by his family members as well as his followers, 
he sets up pesantren where he and his family members can introduce 
                                                     
8 This is based on my private conversion with a sociologist Farish Ahmad Noor who 
just recently interviewed a leading figure of Boria community in Surabaya.   
9 Azra, “Islamic Thought,” p. 8. See also his “Syiah di Indonesia: Antara Mitos dan 
Realitas,” Introduction in A. Rahman Zainuddin (ed.), Syi’ah dan Politik di Indonesia: 
Sebuah Penelitian (Bandung: Mizan, 2000).  
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Islamic teachings in general and Shi‘i tradition in particular to 
Indonesian Muslims. Recently, Bangsri-Jepara has increasingly known 
as place where many Shi‘is resides.10 Husein al-Habsyi is an influential 
Shi‘a figure in East Java. Born in Surabaya in 1921, he converted to 
Shi‘a and established, as we will discuss further in the next section of 
this article, Islamic educational institution in Bangil East-Java that 
become one of his prominent legacies. Like other Shi‘i figures, both 
Bafagih and al-Habsyi have a great deal of difficulties living in Sunnî 
majority population.11 Unlike the above two ulama, Jalaluddin Rahmat 
is well known for his activities in “Dakwah Kampus”. His position as a 
lecturer at Padjadjaran University-Bandung leads him to be more well-
liked among students and younger Muslim activists. His popular 
writings and talks on Islam, leadership, and Sufism also make his 
position more acceptable in urban areas, especially among well-
educated people. Rahmat is well-acquainted with western scholarship 
seeing as he graduated from western education system. Umar Shahab is 
another figure who was educated in Iran in the period of political 
transition of the Iranian Revolution. Umar Shahab and other Qum 
alumni have become well-known ustadhs in Jakarta.    
The Contested Meaning of the Iranian Revolution  
We have discussed slightly about the Impact of the Iranian 
Revolution on Indonesian Muslim activists. The Iranian Revolution in 
fact generated a new development and innovation of religious 
revivalism among Sunni >s, in general, and self-consciousness among 
Shi‘is, in particular.12 In the Indonesian context, we may highlight three 
phases of the development of Shi‘a after the Iranian Revolution 
through Berger and Luckmann’s “social construction theory.” First of 
all, the phase of “externalization” or “taking in culture” signifies the 
process of intellectual transformation of Shi‘a legacy and doctrines in 
the region. Next to it is the phase of “objectification,” which is marked 
by institutionalization of Shi‘a ideas individually and communally 
                                                     
10 See Ahmad Syafi’i, “Profil Ustaz Abdul Qadir Bafagih: Studi tentang Perkembangan 
Paham/Aliran Syi’ah di Desa Bangsri Kab. Jepara Provinsi Jawa Tengah,” in Agama 
dan Perubahan Sosial (Jakarta: Litbang Departemen Agama, 1983).  
11 Zulkifli, “Being a Shi’ie among the Sunni> Majority in Indoensia: A Preliminary Study 
of Ustaz Husein al-Habsyi (1921-1944),” Studia Islamika, Vol. 11 (2004), Issue 2, pp. 
275-308.  
12 See further Muhammad Hisyam, Syiah dan Revolusi Iran (Jakarta: LIPI, 1986).  
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through subjective and normative activities. Finally, the phase of 
“internalization” means “a process of socialization” and “producing 
culture”.  
Intellectual transformation of Shi‘a legacy 
It should be noted that before the Iranian Revolution there a few 
Indonesian students pursuing study in Hawza ‘Ilmiyya at Qum-Iran, 
both in traditional and modern systems. Among the well-known Qum 
alumni who studied at Qum Iran several years prior to the revolution 
are Ali Ridha al-Habsyi, the son of Muhammad al-Habsyi of Habib Ali 
Kwitang of Jakarta. He studied at Qum in 1974. This is followed by 
Umar Shahab who is recently known as famous Shi‘a figure in 
Indonesia. Shahab studied at Qum along with other Indonesian 
students in 1976. Soon after the revolution, especially in 1982, the 
Iranian government announced the initiation of sending more 
Indonesian students to Iran. Some representatives such as Ibrahim 
Ayatullah Amini, Ayatullah Masduqi, and Hujjat al-Islam Mahmudi 
came to Indonesia, visiting some places, including YAPI (Foundation 
of Islamic Education) of Bangil East-Jawa led by Husein al-Habsyi, the 
prominent Shi‘a ulama in the country.13  
It is worth mentioning that since Shi‘a Islam came to public 
attention soon after the Revolution, we may observe the influence of 
two groups in the spread of Shi‘a Islam in contemporary Indonesia: the 
first group is Qum alumni, and the second is student group at 
Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). The two have a great deal of 
characterizing a new development of Shi‘a tradition among Indonesian 
Muslims. Jalaluddin Rahmat, in this respect, has had a great influence 
on Muslim activists at such universities as ITB, Padjadjaran University 
of Bandung (Unpad), Indonesian University of Jakarta (UI) and others. 
One activist graduated from ITB told me that he knew Shi‘a Islam 
during his involvement in the Campus-based halaqah (circle of 
knowledge), and Jalaluddin Rahmat was his mentor. Haidar Bagir, a 
scholar who also very knowledgeable about Shi‘i intellectual treasure 
was also one of the foremost activists of this student group at that 
time. He graduated from ITB and then pursued his advance study at 
Harvard University for his Master degree, and Indonesia University 
(UI) for his Doctoral degree on philosophy. As we will discuss in the 
                                                     
13 See Zulkifly, “Seeking Knowledge onto Qum: The Education of Indonesian Shi‘i 
Ustadhs,” IIAS News Letter, No. 38, September 2005, p. 30.  
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next section, ITB graduates and Qum alumni have played different 
parts, but complementary, in the spread of Shi‘i literature in Indonesia.    
The existence of the Shi‘a before the Iranian Revolution was very 
“secretive.” The sympathizers of Shi‘a did not have enthusiasm for 
overtly propagating their teachings to others. In order to be able to 
integrate within the neighborhood, some dissimulate their beliefs 
(taqiyyah) as means of protecting themselves from any possible threat.14 
Yet, since then, some new converts are more assertive in 
demonstrating their religious orientation or at least to articulate their 
endeavor in bring revolutionary ideas to the country. In his 
observation in several Muslim countries Nikki Keddie concludes: “as a 
gross generalization one may say that the Iranian Revolution was, 
during its course and for many months after its victory, widely 
regarded as inspirational in the Muslim world, and more generally in 
the third world, but that the very positive view of that revolution has 
declined, except among the Shi‘ism of several countries and some 
radical Islamists, especially students.”15 In line with this, Kuntowijoyo 
in his examination of Islamic intellectual history in contemporary 
Indonesia notes: “the impact of the success of Iranian Revolution on 
Muslim dignities in the world could not be forgotten…In Indonesia, a 
country which is politically and religiously less-affected by Iranian 
revolution, the echo of this revolution appears in different ways. The 
writings of Iranian Muslim scholars such as Murtadha Muthahhari, Ali 
Shari’ati, and Bani Sadr were warmly welcomed by younger activists. 
They seemingly have new ‘intellectual weapons’ against system and 
global ideologies.”16 To borrow Mehden’s remark, this is a sort of 
“popular attitudes towards the Revolution.”17 Along with their 
admiration of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt and Neo Marxian 
                                                     
14 Jalaluddin Rahmat, “Dikotomi Sunni-Syi’ah Tidak Relevan Lagi,” in A. Rahman 
Zainuddin & Hamdan Basyar (ed.), Syi’ah dan Politik di Indonesia: Sebuah Penelitian 
(Bandung: Mizan, 2000), p. 145; also Catatan Kang Jalal, Visi Media, Politik dan 
Pendidikan, edited by Miftah F. Rahmat (Bandung: Remaja Rosda Karya, 1998), pp. 
433-460.   
15 Nikki R. Keddie, Iran and the Muslim World: Resistance and Revolution (New York: New 
York University Press, 1995), p. 118. See also John L. Esposito, The Iranian Revolution: 
Its Global Impact (Miami: Florida International University, 1990).  
16 Kuntowijoyo, Paradigma Islam: Interpretasi untuk Aksi (Bandung: Mizan, 1993), p. 315.  
17 Mehden, Two World of Islam: Interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East 
(Florida, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), p. 72.  
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Schools, for example, many Muslim students were familiar with the 
Shi‘a thinkers and Iranian ideologists. Therefore, as Jalaludin Rahmat 
illustrates, along with their discourse of “the Frankfurt School,” the 
Indonesian Muslim students talk about “the Qum School” for their 
social critics.18 Despite the fact that the wave of translation of 
numerous Shi‘a works has enriched Islamic discourse among 
Indonesian Muslims, only few works have dealt straightforwardly with 
the political and religious ideology of Khomeini, the main figure of 
Iranian Revolution. As for the lower rate of publications about or 
written by Khomeini in 1980s, Van Mehden notes that it is probably 
because of the fear of governmental reprisal and because “Khomeini’s 
writings and statements have been primarily Iranian in character.”19 
Yet, after a little while the works of Khomeini and others Shi‘a 
ideologist spread throughout bookstores in some regions.  
Attention should also be paid to the way sympathizers of the Shi‘a 
put forward their identity through discourse. It was the Mizan Press 
that initiated the publication of the so called “Shi‘a books” in the early 
1980s. The Arabic book al-Mura>ja‘a>t constituting a dialogue between A. 
Sharafuddin Al-Musawi and Shaikh Salim al-Bisri al-Maliki was 
selected to be the foremost book published by the Mizan Press in 
1983. It has been entitled Dialog Sunni >-Syi‘ah (A Dialogue between a 
Sunni > and a Shi‘i).20 According to the Director of Mizan Press, Haidar 
Bagir, the publication of this book was inspired by the fact that “there 
was no appropriate and adequate discussion of Shi‘a in Indonesia at 
that time.”21 Because of this, Haidar was suspected of disseminating 
Shi‘a doctrines. At that juncture, most of Shi‘a books being published 
were not necessarily reflecting specific Shi‘a teachings.22 Rather, they 
                                                     
18 Rahmat, “Dikotomi Sunni-Syi’ah,” p. 150.  
19 Mehden, Two World of Islam, p. 73.  
20 As-Sayyid Syarafuddin al Musawi, Dialog Sunnah Syi’ah: Surat menyurat antara asy-Syaikh 
al-Misyri al-Maliki Rektor al-Azhar di Kairo Mesir dan as-Sayyid Syarafuddin al Musawi al 
Amili seorang ulama besar Syi’ah (Bandung: Mizan, 1983). In order to counter this book, 
one publisher in 1989 translated and published the work of Mahmud az-Zabi, Al-
Bayyinat, fi ar Radd ala Abatil al-Muraja’at. See Mahmud az-Zabi, Sunni yang Sunni: 
Tinjauan Dialog Sunni-Syiahnya al-Musawi translated by Ahmadi Thaha and Ilyas Ismail 
(Bandung: Pustaka, 1989).  
21 http://www.mizan.com/portal/template/BacaBerita/kodenews/591. 
22 Some Shi‘a literature are published by, among other things, by the following 
publishers: the Mizan Press, the Lentera, the YAPI Press (Jakarta), the YAPI Press 
  
Hilman Latief 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 02, Number 02, December 2008 
310 
focus with general Islamic themes, such as the concept of family in 
Islam, justice in Islam, women in Islam, moral and ethics in Islam, al-
Quran, the History of Muhammad, and the issues with reference to the 
dialogue between Sunni>s and Shi‘is. Through this way, Shi‘a 
sympathizers attempt to share the resemblances between Shi‘a and 
Sunni >. However, other Shi‘a groups presently became more audacious 
in disseminating their religious principles. They have offered more 
specific themes, constituting the core concepts of Shi‘a legacies that 
‘distinguish’ them from Sunni>’s, such as the concept of ima>mah, the 
superiority of the ahl al-bayt, Imam al-Mahdi, Mut’ah marriage, etc. 
Currently, hundreds of Shi‘a books on Islamic Theology, Ethics/-
Moral, Islamic Jurisprudence, Philosophy, History, Biography, Society, 
Al-Quran, and Hadith, have already been translated into Indonesian 
language and published by several publishers.  
The new generation of Qum alumni and Shi‘a organizations then 
became important agents in the perpetuation of the spread of Shi‘a 
doctrines. If historians mention that the early Shi‘a ideas were probably 
brought from India some centuries ago by Arab-Persian traders or 
some Sufi orders, the contemporary phenomena of “Qum students”, 
starting from 1980s up to now, can be regarded as a new stripe of the 
direct linkage between Indonesian Muslims and Shi‘a ideas intellect-
tually, religiously and, perhaps, politically. Numerous Indonesian 
students studied there (Qum) and brought the teachings of Shi‘a to this 
country. As far as this, most Indonesian students in Qum were coming 
from the families of Shi‘a sympathizers or those having relationship 
with them. But the situation has changes in recent days. Some Sunni>  
Muslims, who knew Shi‘a when they studied in one of the listed 
universities above, told me that he converted to Shi‘a because he 
admired Shi‘a prominent figures. “I was raised in a modernist Muslim 
family; my father is even a local Muslim figure who administers 
modernist Muslim school in my hometown. After having graduated 
from the faculty of engineering at one state university in Jakarta where 
I was acquainted with Shi‘a teachings, I decided to pursue my 
advanced study at Qum Iran,” one Shi‘i convert explains his 
                                                                                                               
(Bangil), the Rosdakarya Press, the Al-Hadi Press, the CV Firdaus Press, the Pustaka 
Firdaus Press, the Risalah Masa Press, the Qonaah Press, the Bina Tauhid Press, the 
Mahdi Press, the Al-Kautsar Press, the Al-Baqir Press, the Al-Bayan Press, the As-
Sajjad Press, the Basrie Press, the Pintu Ilmu Press, the Al-Muntazhar Press, etc.  
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involvement in the Shi‘a community. This Shi‘i convert along with 
other students studied ‘ulu>m al-Qur’a>n (the science of the Quran), ‘ulu>m 
al-h}adi >th (the science of Islamic tradition), fiqh and us}u>l al-fiqh (Islamic 
Jurusprudence), ‘aqi >dah (Theology), and falsafah, h}ikmah or ‘irfa >n 
(Philosophy). The Marka>z Jaha>ni > Ulu>m al Isla>mi under the control of 
Rahbar (Ayatullah al-Uzma Sayyid Ali Khamanei), has so far been 
organizing all international students from across the world, including 
Indonesian students, who are studying religion in Qum.23  
Institutionalization of Shi‘a Islam 
Witnessing Shi‘a-based Islamic education institution, Qum alumni 
have increasingly become an important agent for the growth of the 
Indonesian Shi‘a associations. According to the observation carried out 
in 1997, there were about 25 organizations dealing with Shi‘a in 
Jakarta. Ahmad Barakbah, a Qum alumnus, has mentioned that there 
were no less than 40 Shi‘a organizations that have been established in 
Indonesia, including the Mulla Sadra Foundation (Bogor), the Pesantren 
al-Hadi (in Pakalongan), the Al-Jawad Foundation (in Jakarta), the al-
Muntazhar Foundation (Jakarta), the Yayasan Pesantren Islam/YAPI 
(in Bangil), the Muthahhari Foundation (Bandung), the Fatimah 
Foundation (Jakarta), the Al-Muhibbin Foundation (Probolinggo) and 
others that can be found in Malang, Yogyakarta, Pontianak, Ujung 
Pandang, Samarinda, and Banjarmasin.24 Their core programs and 
activities include education, Islamic gathering, and publication. Among 
the regular publications in the form of bulletin, magazines and semi-
journals issued by the Shi‘is are: Yaum al Quds (Magazine, published by 
the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Jakarta); al Mawaddah 
(Indonesian Ahl al-Bayt Communication Forum); Al Hikmah 
(Muthahari Foundation), Bulletin Al Jawad and Al Ghadir (Al Jawad 
Foundation), Al Tanwir (Muthahhari Foundation), and An Naba 
(Fatimah Foundation).25  
                                                     
23 This is based on my correspondence with the Indonesian Student Association in 
Qum, Iran on 25 July 2005.  
24 Dewi Nurjulianti & Arief Subhan, “Lembaga-lembaga Shi’isme di Indonesia,” 
Ulumul Quran, No. 4, Vol. VI, (1995), pp. 20-25.  
25 Thohir Abdullah Al-Kaff, “Perkembangan Syi’ah di Indonesia,” in Mengapa Kita 
Menolak Syi’ah: Kumpulan Makalah dan Kesimpulan Seminar Nasional Sehari tentang Shi’ism 
(Jakarta: LPPI, 1998), p. 67.  
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While in the 1980s the teachings of Shi‘a were disseminated 
because of, perhaps, the political and intellectual euphoria of the 
Iranian Revolution that, in fact, attracted Indonesian younger Muslims 
and student activists, in the 1990s and afterwards their interest in Shi‘a 
is institutionalized in the form of association or foundation. They, to 
some extent, prefer not to use the word Shi‘a in their outward 
appearance. Instead, they employ the term ahl al-bayt for marking their 
group. Indeed, the term of ahl al-bayt is more neutral in nature compare 
to the term Shi‘a. The aim of the listed foundations above is to 
propagate Shi‘a Islam to Indonesian Muslims. The Al-Jawad 
Foundation, for instance, openly declares its mission: “to practice the 
teachings of the ahlul bayt in daily life, individually and communally, 
and to propagate them extensively within society.” The same idea is 
voiced by the Fatimah Foundation (established in 1997) whose 
objective is “to disseminate the teachings of the ahlul bayt,” and “to 
make the ummah to be the devotees of Muhammad and the ahlul bayt.” 
In short, intellectual transformation in the form of “h}alaqah” of Shi‘a in 
the 1980s has been transformed into that of institutionalized 
movement.  
A non-’confrontational’ way has been taken by some Shi‘a 
communities. Jalaluddin Rahmat, the founder of the Muthahhari 
Foundation, explains that this foundation does not intend to propagate 
Shi‘a. He suggests that for the time being it is necessary for new 
Muslim generations to reduce the dichotomy between Shi‘a and Sunni > 
in order to discourage schism within Muslim society. He employs the 
“ukhuwwah approach” for his strategy to communicate with other 
Muslim fellows (Sunni >s).26 The Muthahhari Foundation whose main 
activity consists of education and publication has taught its students all 
main madhhab (Islamic schools of law), especially the Maliki>, Hambali >, 
Hanafi >, Syafi’i>, and Ja’fari >. There is a marked contrast between the 
feature of Muthahhari Foundation and that of other Shi‘a 
organizations such as the Al-Jawad Foundation of Bandung, YAPI of 
Bangil, Pesantren al-Hadi of Pekalongan, and the Fatimah Foundation 
of Jakarta. The mission of the Muthahhari Foundation has increasingly 
become more moderate in articulating the Shi‘a religious principles. 
                                                     
26 See Dedy Djamaluddin Malik dan Idi Subandy Ibrahim, Zaman Baru Islam Indonesia: 
Pemikiran dan Aksi Politik Abdurrahman Wahid, M. Amien Rais, Nurcholish Madjid dan 
Jalaluddin Rakhmat (Bandung: Zaman Wacan Mulia, 1998)  
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The Fatimah Foundation, for instance, has taken the opposite way by 
publishing some articles in response to the Sunni > criticism, such as 
“the Deviations of the Doctrines of Ahlu Sunnah wa al Jama>‘ah,” “The 
Blemished Wahhabis’ Characteristics,” “the Mistakes of Muhammad 
Companions,” and the like.27 In conjunction with this, Pesantren al-Hadi 
of Pakalongan, having operated since 1989, has sent a number of its 
alumni to Qum-Iran. Along with the YAPI in Bangil, this Pekalongan 
based pesantren is perhaps the only Islamic educational institution in the 
country adopting the hawza system of Qum in its curriculum.28 Some 
factors may have generated the institutionalization of Shi‘a Islam. First 
of all, the increasing Shi‘a sympathizers in number in several regions 
require more organized activities. They realize that a new step should 
be taken into consideration, unifying a sporadic movement of 
Indonesian Shi‘is. As a minority, Shi‘a sympathizers need more social 
and political recognitions from a wider scope of audiences, especially 
the outsiders. Another factor is relied on insiders’ need. For them, 
institutionalizing Shi‘a Islam would give lots of benefits to the 
community. It provides a more comprehensive reading facility (library), 
offers more reliable curricula for new converts, and strengthens social 
cohesion among the existing communities. Therefore, it is expected 
that Shi‘a sympathizers will be able to deal with both political and 
religious/spiritual principles of the Shi‘a.  
The decline of the New Order regime in 1998 has had a profound 
impact on Indonesian Muslims. Along with the emergence of new 
revivalism among the Sunni> mainstream, the Shi‘a Islam witnessed a 
remarkable situation where religious freedom was strongly supported 
by the government, especially under Abdurrahman Wahid’s 
administration. At that juncture, the public sphere was engulfed by the 
rise new religious movements, ranging from the most radical groups to 
the liberal ones. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) is a prominent 
inclusive Muslim scholar and the former President of the Republic of 
Indonesia whose commitment to shoring up religious freedom and 
pluralism is unquestionable. Prompted by this situation, a number of 
Indonesian Shi‘is declared a new association, namely IJABI 
                                                     
27 See http://www.fatimah.org/indexartikel.htm  
28 Nurjulianti & Subhan, “Lembaga-lembaga Shi’ismh di Indonesia,” p. 24; Tatik S. 
Hafidz “Dari Qum, ke Bangil dan Pekalongan,” Tiras, No 3/Thn II/15 February 1996.  
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(Association of Indonesian Ahlul Bayt Society) on 1 July 2000,29 and 
publicly announced their first national congress on 4 July at the same 
year in Bandung-West Java.30 About two thousand people from twenty 
provinces attended this congress. Pertaining to the identity of this 
organization, the IJABI, in the Introduction (Muqaddimah) of its 
Guiding Principles (Anggaran Dasar), asserts:  
“For centuries, Indonesian Muslims have preserved their 
love for the ahl al-bayt. In order to continue the struggles of 
the previous ulama>s, the lovers of the ahl al-bayt in 
Indonesia intend to unify and strengthen communities by 
establishing social organization based on the tawhi>d (unity 
of God), nubuwwah (prophethood), ima >mah (leadership), 
justice, and the return of the servants to God, the Rahma>n 
(the most compassionate) and the Rahi>m (the most 
merciful)…By taking the blessing of the prophet’s 
(Muhammad) sayings: “The ahl al-bayt is like Noah’s ark 
(during the flood and typhoon). Those who travel and join 
with this ark would be safe; otherwise, they would be sunk 
and thrown.” We have established the Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul 
Bait Indonesia (IJABI) as the ark of our safety…By saying 
bismilla >hi majre>ha wa mursa>ha, and being accompanied by the 
light of ahlul bayt ‘Alaihi Salam, we launch the ark of IJABI 
that would protect all the lovers of the ahl al-bayt from their 
enemies, would develop their thinking spiritually, 
intellectually and morally, as well as would offer prosperity 
for all Muslims...”  
This congress is a momentous event for the Indonesian Shi‘a to be 
recognized extensively by society.31 This also becomes a medium for 
them to be able to integrate with the Sunni> Muslim fellows, as a 
                                                     
29 “Kang Jalal: Tujuan IJABI, berdayakan yang lemah,” Pikiran Rakyat, 2 July 2000.  
30 “Ijabi Dideklarasikan di Bandung,” Kompas, 4 July 2000.  
31 Being recognized by society is an essential step in seeking cultural, social and legal 
justification. In the process of internalization, according Berger and Luckmann, 
legitimacy is an important phase, especially where the established organizations 
belonging to the minority, in this case Shi‘a, need social recognition and religious 
justifications. Nevertheless, this community has still faced religious, cultural and even 
political boundaries to be justified by Sunni>s due to different perspective held by 
Indonesian Sunni>s. Peter L Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of 
Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Anchor Book Edition, 1967), 
pp. 92-116.  
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majority, by sharing and voicing resemblances with Sunnis without 
reducing Shi‘a identity. Jalaluddin Rahmat, for example, the chairman 
and one of the initiators of this association, frequently emphasizes that 
the IJABI is an open mass organization whose membership is not 
restricted to Shi‘a. “We would like to open a wide definition of the 
lovers of the ahl al-bayt,” Jalal adds. In a wider definition, therefore, the 
IJABI will cover all divisions of Shi‘a that exist in Indonesia, and 
welcome those (among Sunni >sm) who know, feel sympathy and, more 
importantly, love the ahl al-bayt and their descendants.32 IJABI then set 
up its branches in several provinces and became the largest Shi‘i 
association at that time. Jalaluddin Rahmat was elected as a 
chairperson. In this sense, the participation of ITB’s and Qum’s alumni 
cannot be neglected from the establishment of IJABI. It goes without 
saying nevertheless that rivalry or conflict between them disappears. 
Like other mass organizations, Shi‘i communities were to some extent 
fragmented into different groups: IJABI and non-IJABI that in some 
way have been connected to such a rivalry between Qum alumni and 
non-Qum alumni. In recent days, IJABI is not as strong as in its early 
period. The first group, called LKAB (Ahlul Bayt Communication 
Forum), comprises Qum alumni. It is sponsored by Islamic Cultural 
Center (ICC) and recognized by the government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. ICC is headed by Sheikh Mohsen Hakimollahi. A 
number of Qum alumni and Shi‘i ustadhs such as Ali Hussein Alatas, 
Umar Shahab, Hussein Shahab, Muhsin Labib, Abdullah Beik, Mahdi 
Alaydrus and others affiliate to this institution. The second group is 
IJABI. Compare to the previous group, the IJABI seems to be more 
inclusive in a way that they welcome to Sunni Muslims who are willing 
to join “ahl al-bayth madhhab.” It is also reported that some activists of 
“Qumiyyu>n” and “Ijabiyyu >n” have attempted to reconcile the existing 
groups.      
“A process of socialization” and “producing culture” 
The majority of Indonesian Shi‘a is the Ithna ‘Ash‘ariyah. The 
appearance of this group in the public sphere is more often than the 
two others. Therefore, since Zaidia and Isma’ilia are sociologically 
insignificant in the region, they would not be discussed further in this 
piece. In the Indonesian context, being a ‘true’ Shi‘i remains 
                                                     
32 “Mumpung Gus Dur Jadi Presiden,” Gatra, 15 July 2000.  
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interpretable, at least, as shown by Shi‘a sympathizers. Graham E. 
Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke present various definitions in their 
observation of Shi‘a communities in several Sunni populated countries. 
For most Shi‘a, “the definition of Shi‘a is compound of religious, 
cultural, historical, and social attributes, and it is ultimately a definition 
determined by individual.”33 Some perhaps give emphasis to the 
religious component, while others may put emphasis on cultural and 
social aspect. In a more strict definition, Shi‘a is “a religious faith and a 
way of life based on that faith.”34 According to this view, therefore, 
Shi‘a as an identity is “inseparable from adherence to religious faith, 
and it is the active practice of Shi‘a, that expresses identity.”35 If we 
take such a definition into account, we may observe how the 
Indonesian Shi‘a expresses their identity through the so called “active 
practice” that distinguishes them from the Sunni faith.  
If it is true that the Iranian Revolution had attracted Sunni 
Muslims’ attention across the world, the further questions are: to what 
extent the Indonesian Muslims (students and activists) are admired by 
such a revolution, to what extent the works written by Shi‘a 
intellectuals have characterized both Sunni Muslim youths and new 
Shi‘a converts? Have new Shi‘a sympathizers been only interested in 
Shi‘a theological doctrines, or in both socio-political and religious 
practices? The sympathizers of Shi‘a themselves have faced a great deal 
of difficulties to define their specific Indonesian Shi‘is identity because 
their theological and ideological viewpoint are as varied as their 
religious, social and educational backgrounds.36 Some sympathizers of 
the Shi‘a are simply admired by the intellectual treasure and socio-
political dimension of Shi‘a. Others are concerned with its theological 
doctrines. There are also those who deal with philosophy, theology and 
religious practices.37 Thus, the variants of Indonesian Shi‘a are actually 
                                                     
33 Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, The Arab Shi‘ism: The Forgotten Muslims 
(Hampshire and London: Macmillan Press, 1999), p. 17.  
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Rahmat, “Dikotomi Sunni-Syi’ah,” p. 148.  
37 The Shi‘a religious practices performed and organized by the Shi‘ism organizations 
as the way they preserve Shi‘ism traditions include prayers (thaharah, salat, routine 
recitation of Du’a Kumayl, Tawassul, Faraj, etc.), religious events (i.e. the 
commemoration of religious festivals: the born of Muhammad, Fatimah b. 
Muhammad, ‘Ali b. ‘Ali Thalib, Hasan b. ‘Ali, Husein b ‘Ali, etc.) and other rituals. As 
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coherent with the problem of definition that has been pointed out 
earlier by Fuller and Francke. In this regard, there are some factors that 
have presumably shaped some sympathizers to deal with particular 
aspects of Shi‘a and at the same time overlook others. A university 
student who often comes to one of Shi‘a foundation told me that he is 
impressed by Shi‘a political experience, either in classical Islamic 
period or contemporary Iran, and the influence Shi‘a thinkers. Yet, he 
avoids practicing particular religious practice that a Shi‘i does. There 
are also some possibilities why he and other sympathizers do so: First, 
they may have not been interested in the fiqh, but merely in political or 
philosophical ideas of Shi‘a. Second, they may have been faced by firm 
cultural and political obstacles in their religious and social 
environment. Third, they may have achieved Shi‘a teachings simply 
from their readings, not from an intensive gathering with Indonesian 
Shi‘a scholars. In another case, my informant (female, 42), a 
sympathizer of Shi‘a regularly recites Kumail and the prayer belonging 
to Zainal ‘Abidin. However, she is trying to avoid “exaggerated 
expression” of her devotional to main Shi‘a saints.38  
As mentioned before, Qum alumni’s contribution to characterizing 
Indonesian Shi‘is is noteworthy, fulfilling the need of those interested 
in practicing Shi‘a fiqh. It is mentioned that whereas the first generation 
of Qum alumni are deeply concerned with intellectual discourse, the 
second generation began practicing Shi‘a fiqh. The former is more 
inclusive and open-minded, while the later is in some way more 
exclusive in attitudes. In this respect, Jalaluddin Rahmat points out that 
since Shi‘a fiqh coagulates among Shi‘a sympathizers, the system of 
marja>‘iyyah or marja>’ at-taqli>d (“sources of imitation”) comes 
instantaneously into existence. There are some prominent Iraqi and 
Iranian Shi‘a ‘ulama>s whom Indonesian Shi‘a much refer to, such as 
Ayyatullah Al-Uzhma Sayyid Ali Huseini Sistani (Najaf, Iraq), 
Ayyatullah Al-Uzhma Al-Imam Ruhullah Al-Musawi Al-Khomeini 
(Iran), Ayyatullah Al-Uzhma Sayyid Ali Huseini Khemenei (Iran), 
Ayyatullah Al-Uzhma Syekh Muhammad Taqi Bahjat Fumani (Qum, 
                                                                                                               
for the theology, it is primarily concerned with ima >mah and the need of ummah of the 
ma‘sum ima>m.  
38 For the prayer of Zayn al-Abidin, see The Psalm of Islam (Al-Shahifa>t al-Sajjadiya), 
translated with introduction and annotation by William Chitick (Oxford, New York, 
etc.: The Muhammadi Trust of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1988).  
  
Hilman Latief 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 02, Number 02, December 2008 
318 
Iran), Ayyatullah Al-Uzhma Syeikh Lutfullah Shafi Gulpaegani (Qum, 
Iran), and Ayyatullah Al-Uzhma Syeikh Muhammad Fahdl Lankarani 
(Qum, Iran). My interview with a Shi‘i (a male, 38 years old) reveals 
that the Qum alumni have a strong determination in shaping the 
characteristic of religious outlooks of new Shi‘a sympathizers through 
their intensive and regular religious gatherings.39 Therefore, most of 
the mara>ji‘ of the Indonesian Shi‘a are Iranian ‘Ulama>s. Accordingly, 
nearly all teachers or ustadhs in the Shi‘a organizations are Qum 
alumni, and they are able to share deeply the Ja‘faria School of law in 
addition to the philosophy and Shi‘a theological doctrines.  
The typical Indonesian Shi‘a is less-obvious. When the history of 
Shi‘a community has long been characterized by political encounter 
with the state and Sunni domination, why the Shi‘a communities in 
Indonesia are less political is another interesting issue. Martin Van 
Bruinessen, in relation to this case, argues that Shi‘is political character 
has been changed by their intellectual sense. The Shi‘a movement in 
Indonesia, Bruinessen emphasizes, “is no longer considered 
revolutionary sectarian movement; rather it becomes introversionist.”40 
Since the Shi‘a community in Southeast Asia is a minority, as Fred R. 
von der Mehden has pointed out, there is “no natural base for Iranian 
influence as exists in parts of the Middle East.”41 One of the 
                                                     
39 Interview, 28 July 2005.  
40 Martin van Bruinessen, “Gerakan Sempalan di Kalangan Umat Islam Indonesia: 
Latar Belakang Sosial Budaya,” ‘Ulumul Qur’an, Vol III no 1 (1992): pp. 16-27.  
41 Even so, it does not mean there was no political tendency among them. There were 
a few actions that could be regarded as a direct political impact of the Iranian 
Revolution either among Sunnis or Shi‘is. For example, in 1986 the Soeharto regime 
persecuted those getting involved in Malang bombings. They, through an organization 
called “The Indonesian Islamic Revolution Board,” attempted to bring down the 
regime by seeking political support from Iran and Libya. In another case, the pattern 
of Iran as an “Islamic State” has been idealized by a certain Sunni Muslim who sought 
the implementation of Islamic state in the country. See Mehden, Two World of Islam, p. 
73. It was Irfan Suryahadi who was sentenced to thirteen years in the prison after 
accused of being subversive by the regime. He was the editor of magazine Risalah, and 
published an article entitled “Wejangan Ayatullah Khomeini” (The Advices of 
Ayatullah Khomeini). It is reported that Suryahadi had frequently contacted the 
Iranian Embassy in Jakarta. Ibid.; see also Amnesty International, “The imprisonment 
of Irfan Suryahadi,” in Indonesian Report, Human Rights Supplements no. 18 
October 1986, pp. 5-9; ICG Asia Briefing, TK August 2002, “Al-Qaeda in Southeast 
Asia: The Case of the Ngruki Network” in Indonesia, http://www.indonesia-
house.org/archive/BaliAriefB.pdf; Currently, Irfan Suryahadi Awwas is the executive 
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sympathizers says that “Shi‘a politics” is a topic that is rarely discussed 
in his community for the duration of his participation in the “Shi‘a 
h}alaqah”. There are probably two reasons compel them to do so: first, 
up to now the position of Shi‘a remains marginal. In the context of 
nation state, they are numerical and functional minorities. Second, they 
perhaps realized that there are numerous Sunni groups who feel 
threaten by such a discourse. Juan Cole in his study of the Shi‘a 
minority asserts: “Among the key struggles of the Twelver Shi‘a 
communities in the twentieth century was the problem of coming to 
terms with being minorities in a nation state.” He then presents two 
categories of Shi‘a minorities, which are numerical minorities (i.e. Shi‘a 
communities in Iran Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan), and functional minorities (i.e. Bahrain, Iraq and Soviet 
Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan). It seems that he does not include 
Indonesia into his discussion because most of Indonesian Shi‘is are the 
recent converts whose political roles remain insignificant.42  
There are some policies issued by minority groups in facing the 
majorities. A sociologist and political scientist Terence E. Cook 
contrasts three main different policies and strategies that can be used 
by a minority group, namely separation, assimilation, or accommo-
dation.43 His study concerning ethnic and religious minorities in several 
regions reveals that the “stronger minorities,” including religious 
communities, typically use “separation as segregation,” “assimilation as 
controls,” and “accommodation as minimal.” In contrast, the “weaker 
minorities” employ “separation as separatism,” “assimilation as 
integration,” and “accommodation as maximal.” If we take such a 
formulation into account, I would say at this point that Indonesian 
Shi‘a is not strong enough in number. Therefore, “assimilation as 
                                                                                                               
chairman of the Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia, an organization that strongly encourages 
the establishment of Islamic state in Indonesia.   
42 See Juan Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi’ism Islam 
(New York & London: I.B. Tauris Publisher, 2002), p. 173. Therefore, the Shi’is do 
not face any significant political barrier from the government; instead they have been 
faced with the Sunni theological outlooks. However, unlike Shi‘a in the Middle Eastern 
countries that has a long historical tension with the Sunnism politically and religiously, 
Indonesian Shi‘a for the most part are the recent converts especially after the Iranian 
Revolution.  
43 Terrence A. Cook, Separation, Assimilation, or Accommodation: Contrasting Ethnic Minority 
Policies (London: Westport, Connecticut, 2003).  
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integration” and “accommodation as maximal” are two strategies that 
have been used by Shi‘a communities in order to preserve their 
ongoing missions and institutions. In a broader context, up to now, the 
“accommodation as maximal” strategy has been employed by most of 
the Shi‘is. As the “weaker minorities,” being recognized socially and 
religiously by the Sunni> Muslims and the government in the region 
where they are able to practice their beliefs, commemorate Asyura 
ritual, memorialize the h }aul of Imam Khomeini, establish their 
organizations, and publish their books is a good result of their 
accommodation strategy. By taking this strategy, therefore, the 
Indonesian Shi‘a put their political tendencies aside, at least for a while. 
This actually differs from such Sunni Muslim groups as the Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI)44 and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)45 
that openly campaign for the establishment of Islamic state and that of 
khilafah system in order to replace the ongoing Indonesian democracy. 
In my consideration, the silence of Shi‘a in regards to the absent of 
Shi‘a political dimension as a revolutionary sectarian movement in the 
era of transition of Indonesian politics when other religious 
communities, notably Sunnis have opportunities to communicate their 
interest freely is not caused by their fear of the government; instead 
they are anxious of their Sunni purists, especially the radical ones.  
“Islam Alternatif”: In Search of New Identity of Indonesian 
Islam  
Islam alternatif (“alternative Islam”) is basically a book’s title written 
by Jalaluddin Rahmat by the late 1980s. This is a collection of his 
speeches in many campuses. Presenting dimensions of Islam such as 
spiritualism, philosophy, Sufism and notably social critiques in a more 
popular way, this book gained respect from younger readers and 
university student activists. In recent times, this term has been adopted 
by a group of Indonesian students, especially those studying at Qum, 
and those interested in Shi‘a tradition. It is very common among 
Indonesians to have labeled certain groups of Muslims based on their 
                                                     
44 See Irfan Suryahadi Awwas, Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syari’ah Islam 
(Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001).  
45 Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, “The Demand for Shari’ah as positive law in 
Indonesia,” (Paper presented on Panel 4 “Islam in Positive Law and the Indonesian 
Legal System” at the Conference “Islamic Law in Modern Indonesia,” Legal Islamic 
Studies Program, Harvard Law School, 17-18 April 2004).  
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religious viewpoints. We note “Islam Liberal” that is often abbreviated 
to “Islib”, signifying progressive and liberal Muslim thinkers; and “Islam 
Literal” (Islit) that marks conservative and fundamentalist groups. 
Contemporary Shi‘i sympathizers especially among youth have also 
popularized “Islam Alternatif” (Islat) to identify themselves. Using this 
term they attempted to offer the possibility of choice on being a 
Muslim, something that is different from the existing one. The word 
“alternative” in this respect primarily relates to the worldview, 
philosophical and religious standpoint of Shi‘a tradition.  
If we take a look closer at the issues and topics that the existing 
Muslim groups have often dealt with, we may assume that Islat, 
comparing to Islib and Islit, captures nuance of Islamic discourse in 
general, and Shi‘i tradition in particular. They also intend to enrich the 
Indonesian Muslims’ horizons, claiming to be in the middle path. Then 
tension between the progressive-liberal Muslims and conservative-
radical Muslims in recent times has also led Shi‘a Islam to become 
more acceptable for younger Indonesian Muslim activists. The 
progressive-liberal Muslims and conservative-radical younger Muslims 
have different religious backgrounds. It is mentioned that, on the one 
hand, some students having no sufficient religious education from 
their family are often radicalized when they found Islam as a new thing 
at the university. They hold literal interpretation of Islam as formulated 
by Muslim purist ‘ulama either on the matters of fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence) or al-siya>siyya (politics). They much refer to such 
scholars as Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab and Abdullah b. Baz for 
Islamic theology and jurisprudence, as well as Hassan al-Banna and 
Sa’id Hawa for politics and Islamic movement (haraka al-Isla >miyya). On 
the other hand, some Muslim liberal thinkers witnessed the opposite 
experience. After having graduated from traditional Islamic schools, 
they pursue their higher education at university and receive materials 
on Islam by adopting western ‘secular’ methodology. Their enthusiasm 
on being a good Muslim reflects in the efforts of enhancing the 
substance of religion by neglecting literal understanding. When the two 
groups meet in the public sphere, the tension between them is 
unavoidable. For several years, Indonesian Muslims witnessed 
remarkable encounters among the competing groups (Islib and Islit) 
that lead them to ineffective conflict instead of prolific dialogue. Due 
to this, Shi‘a sympathizers come up with the ideas that, according to 
their expectation, can make “difference”, promoting Shi‘a tradition and 
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intellectual treasure. The Islat claims to have combined between text 
and rationalism. One Qum alumni writes “It is particularly expected 
that the alumni of Hawzah Qum in Indonesia can fill the vacuum left by 
liberal…and literal…Muslims.”46 
The Shi‘is in general and Islat’s activists in particular also have 
called their religious perspective “Madhab ahl al-bayt” (ahlul bayt school 
of thought). In recent times, they have shared their opinion and 
religious standpoint by publishing articles in their own website. This 
endeavor, as far as their experience is concerned, also helps them to 
communicate further with other Sunnis, notably the younger 
Indonesian Muslims studying abroad such as in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia, as well as those studying in European or American 
higher education institutions. Indonesian Student Association (HPI) in 
Iran has played active role in the making of stronger relations with 
other Indonesian Muslim students in the Middle East. It is worth 
emphasizing that even though not all Sunni Muslim students agree 
with particular aspects of Shi‘i Islam, in my consideration, some 
younger Shi‘a sympathizers (HPI and Islat) have begun to promote 
openness and inclusivity. It goes without saying that the encounters 
between Sunnis and Shi‘is always develop in harmony. Since some 
kinds of religious issues that they ‘by nature’ disagree with, such as 
Ima>ma and khila>fa, mut }’ah married, and the like, are brought into 
discussion, disagreement and warm debates among them occur.  
The innovation made by Shi‘a sympathizers can be seen in their 
perspective on international issues. Immediately after America under 
George W. Bush’s administration decided to attack Iraq, and Bush’ 
vigorous campaign against nuclear weapon of Iran launched, strong 
reaction emerged among Indonesian muslims, both Sunni >s and Shi‘is. 
Indonesian Shi‘is in particular have a great deal of criticizing America 
by referring to the sayings of Iranian Muslim scholars. The sayings of 
Rahbar or prominent Shi‘a ulama, and the messages of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Ahmadinejad, are frequently translated from Persian 
into Bahasa Indonesia and published in their website. These sayings 
seem very influential for Indonesian Shi‘a sympathizers, especially in 
determining their religious and political attitudes in response to 
international political situation. Not only this, the tension between Iran 
                                                     
46 See Muhsin Labib, “Islat: Antara Islib dan Islit,” in http://islamalternatif.-
net/iph/content/view/72/32/ 
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and Israel has also become their deep concern as Shi‘i Iranian ulama 
carry out forceful campaign against Israel. Seen from this, we may not 
neglect from the discussion the network between Indonesian Shi‘i 
sympathizers’, Shi‘a ulama and Iranian government. Inhospitable 
relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United State of 
America, Saudi Arabia, or Israel has certainly had a greater influence 
over Indonesian Shi‘i discourse on global imperialism, ideology of 
capitalism, westernization as well as Islamic Wahabia.  
Between Vigorous Campaign against Shi‘a and Intra-religious 
Dialogue  
The relationship between Sunnis and Shi‘is is contingent upon 
several factors. Religious outlooks and political tendencies of 
Indonesian Sunnis and Shi‘is are as varied as their social and political 
backgrounds. Some of Sunni groups accuse Shi‘a of deviating from 
Islam. The Shi‘is are condemned as apostates. Others see them simply 
as a Muslim entity whose religious viewpoints and attitudes differ in 
some way from Sunni >s. Nonetheless, we have to note that, in the 
Indonesian case, serious campaigns against Shi‘a emerged along with 
the growth of Shi‘i sympathizers in the country and the dissemination 
of Shi‘a doctrines following the Iranian Revolution. By the early 1980s 
and even before, some works dealing with Shi‘i tradition were written 
by Sunni scholars. Aboebakar Atjeh in 1965, for example, wrote Shi‘i 
and rationalism in Islam.47 Some others penned Shi‘a tradition whether 
in popular or academic ways. M. Rasjidi published his piece on Shi‘a in 
1984 from the Sunni’s point of view.48 In recent times, a very well-
known Indonesian Muslim scholar who is also a professor on Tafsir 
(Quranic Exegesis), Quraish Shihab, launched his work that promotes 
dialogue and mutual understanding between Sunni and Shi‘i.49 It is 
interesting to note that although both Rasdjidi and Shihab are 
members of Indonesian ‘Ulama Council (MUI) in different period, and 
                                                     
47 Aboebakar Atjeh, Sji’ah: Rasionalisme dalam Islam (Djakarta: Jajasan Pendjelidikan 
Islam, 1965).  
48 H. M. Rasdjidi, Apa itu Syiah (Jakarta: Pelita, 1984).  
49 Quraish Shihab, Sunnah Syi’ah Bergandengan Tangan, Mungkinkah? Kajian atas Konsep 
Ajaran dan Pemikiran (Jakarta: Lenter Hati, 2007). It should be noted that such a spirit 
of dialogue is also held by Husein al-Habsyi. Based on his dialogue with some Muslim 
student activists, he published Sunnah Syi’ah dalam Dialog antara Mahasiswa UGM dan 
UII Yogyakarta dengan Ustadz Husein al-Habsyi (Solo: Yayasan Ats-Tsaqalain, 1991).   
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both are professors at the State Institute of Islamic Studies, the typical 
perspective they have raised is rather different. The later seems to have 
been more open-minded in response to Shi‘a than the former. In 
recent times, some works resembling a sort of ‘heresiograpy’ that 
covers Islamic sects were also written by conservative purist Muslims.50 
The variety of literature on Shi‘a mentioned above certainly reflects 
the typical Sunni’s response to Shi‘i in the real life. It is Dewan 
Dakwah Islamiyyah Indonesia (DDII) that since 1980s has very active 
campaigning against Shi‘a in the region. Some activists of DDII 
graduated from Middle Eastern countries, notable Saudi Arabia, and 
have close connection with Saudi’s government and ‘ulama. They 
publish numerous works criticizing Shi‘a tradition as well as other 
Muslim sects such as Ahmadiyya. This is then followed by the MUI, 
semi-governmental body of ulama, where some DDII activists along 
with other Muslim scholars affiliating to such Muslim organizations as 
the Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam, and the Nahdlatul ‘Ulama were 
also MUI’s members. There some points concerning Shi‘a doctrines 
issued by the MUI five years subsequent to the Iranian Revolution. To 
begin with, the Shi‘a Islam, according to MUI, has fragmented the 
hadith transmission by rejecting the non-Shi‘a transmitters; while Sunni, 
as the MUI has claimed, has never differentiated h}adith transmitters, 
whether they are coming prophet’s family or not. Second, Shi‘a 
believes that an ima>m (leader) is ma‘su>m (“free from making any 
mistake”). This outlook is considered misleading by the MUI because 
ima>m is simply regarded as an ordinary human being who is be able to 
make mistakes. Another aspect relates to ijma>‘, consensus or agreement 
among ‘ulama> concerning certain religious matters. According to Shi‘a 
tradition, ijma >‘ needs Imam’s approval. By contrast, Sunnis do not 
require ijma >‘ to have such kind of approval. Next to it, Shi‘a Islam 
suggests that Islamic leadership is mandatory and a part of Islamic 
principle, and thus Muslim community should be led by an imam. 
According to some Sunni >s, however, Islam has nothing to with a 
particular concept of Islamic state or political leadership. Islam just 
offers general principles and ethics how to govern society. Fifth, Shi‘is 
for the most part disapprove the leadership of Abu Bakar, Umar bin 
                                                     
50 Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, Aliran dan Faham Sesat di Indonesia (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 
2002). The writer is very well-known an Indonesian Sunni “heresiographer” whose 
works very much focus on “deviant Islamic sects”.  
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Khattab, and Uthman bin ‘Affan. They believe that Ali bin Abi Talib 
and his descendant were the rightful Muhammad successors. Finally, 
according to the MUI’s fatwa>s, there are fundamental differences 
between Sunni and Shi‘a, and the fatwa>s lay emphasis on protecting 
Sunni Muslims from the influence of the Shi‘a doctrines.51  
Muhammad Atho Mudzhar emphasizes that the major concern of 
MUI’s fatwa>s issued in 8 March 1984 regarding Muslim minorities, 
especially the Shi‘a, include government’s anxiety about political 
impacts of the Iranian Revolution on Indonesia Muslims. He 
moderately notes:  
We know that 1979 was the year of Iranian Revolution, 
which toppled the secular government of the Shah and 
replaced it with an Islamic one. Apparently the echo of that 
resounded beyond Iranian territories and reached 
Indonesia. It was rumored that some Muslim youths were 
to be the target for the exportation of the ideas of the 
Iranian Islamic revolution. It was in this context that the 
government saw it necessary to take precautionary steps to 
prevent such Islamic revolutionary ideas from developing 
in the country, and it was also in this context the M.U.I. 
made its contribution to the efforts to preserve the 
establishment by issuing the fatwa >. Thus, while the 
arguments of fatwa>s were classical and theological in nature, 
the goals were contemporary and political. It is too obvious 
to ignore the fact that the actual concern of the fatwa > was 
with the doctrine of the ima >ma and nothing else.52 
On September 1997, a National Seminar was carried out in the 
Istiqlal Mosque of Jakarta. This seminar was cosponsored by the LPPI 
(Institute of research and Islamic Studies), Muslim purists-based mass 
organizations. The seminar aims at condemning Shi‘a doctrines and 
their influence in the country. The speakers joining this seminar were 
key persons of various Sunni organizations, such as K. H. Mohammad 
Dawam Anwar (Katib Syuriah, Nahdlatul ‘Ulama), K.H. Irfan Zidny 
(Lajnah Falakiyyah Syuriah of Nahdlatul ‘Ulama), K.H. Thohir Al-Kaff 
(Al-Bayyinat Foundation), Nabhan Hussein (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
                                                     
51 Muhammad Atho Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic 
Legal Thought in Indonesia 1975-1988, bilingual edition (Jakarta: INIS, 1993), pp. 114-
115.  
52 Ibid., p. 17.  
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Indonesia), K.H. A. Latif Mukhtar (Persatuan Islam), Hidayat 
Nurwahid (Al-Haramain Fundation), and Syu’bah Asa (Editor of Panji 
Masyarakat Magazine).  
In line with the arguments issued in the MUI’s National Meeting, 
this seminar issued some more points: 1) Shi‘a believes that the Quran 
is imperfect since its complete version will be brought by the Ima>m al-
Muntaz}ar (the waited Imam); 2) they believe in the taqiyyah; 3) the 
Jum‘at Prayer is not mandatory without the present of their ima>m; 4) 
Shi‘a has changed the sentences of adhan (call to prayer in Islam) by 
adding the words “wa ashhadu anna ‘Aliyyan waliyulla >h” (We testify that 
‘Ali is a God’s Guardian); 5) they practice Mut}‘ah marriage; and 6) It is 
the fact that, according to this group, Shi‘is were becoming betrayers, 
agents of crime, and terrorists who have strong resistance against 
official state led by Sunnis. Moreover, for the sake of political and 
social stabilities in the region, the seminar’s committee members, 
which were K.H. Djamaluddin, K.H. Mustafa ‘Ali Ya’qub, K.H. 
Ahmad Khalil Ridwan, Abdul Qadir Al-Attas, and Ahmad Zain Al-
Kaff, insisted the government to be able to: 1) prohibit the spread of 
Shi‘a doctrines in Indonesia because the Shi‘is would be disloyal 
politically to Indonesian government; 2) forbid the dissemination Shi‘i 
books; 3) invalidate the licenses of their organizations and educational 
institutions; 4) allow MUI to investigate Shi‘a publications; 5) forbid 
the Iranian Embassy from disseminating the Shi‘a teachings.53 With the 
purpose of supporting their claims, the Sunnis also quoted sayings and 
opinions of the Sunni scholars and their refutation of Shi‘a, such as 
Imam Malik, Imam Ahmad, Ibn Qutaiba, Ibn Hazm, Al-Qadhi ‘Iyadh, 
al-Sam’ani, and Ibn Taimiya. Yet, particular Indonesian Shi‘is attempt 
to reply to such a threat by publishing books and articles.54  
Despite the fact that some of the speakers in the seminar above are 
main figures in their own organizations, they speak on behalf of 
themselves. As a matter of fact, the Nahdlatul ‘Ulama, the largest 
Muslim Sunni organization in Indonesia within which K.H. Irfan 
                                                     
53 See Umar Abduh and Abu Huzaifah (ed.), Mengapa Kita Menolak Syi’ah: Kumpulan 
Makalah dan Kesimpulan Seminar Nasional Sehari tentang Syi’ah (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-
Kautsar, 1988), pp. 158-162.  
54 See O Hashem, Jawaban Lengkap atas Seminar Sehari tentang Syi’ah (Bangil: YAPI, 
1997); Muhammad Babul Ulum, Merajut Ukhuwah Memahami Syi’ah: Memuat Catatan 
untuk Hidayat Nur Wahid (Bandung: Marja, 2008).  
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Zidny and K. H. Mohammad Dawam Anwar were leading members, 
does not issue any ‘official’ opinion on this subject. On the other hand, 
other main figures of this traditionalist organization, such as K.H. 
Abdurrahman Wahid and K.H. Said Agil Siradj, seem to take the 
opposite way. They consider Shi‘a simply as another Islamic school of 
thought that attempts to propagate Muhammad’s teachings. “In 
principle, the Shi‘is uphold the tradition (sunnah) and justice (‘ada >lah) 
whatever the risk,” explains Siradj, “while the Sunni paid attention to 
the tradition (sunnah) and the unity of the community (jama>’ah). 
Therefore, Sirajd adds, “the Shi‘is are called ahlu Sunnah wa al-‘ada>lah, 
while the Sunni >s ahlu Sunnah wa al-jama>’ah. Both defend and propagate 
the teachings of Muhammad.”55 A similar opinion has been voiced by 
Abdurrahman Wahid. He figures out that there are some similarities 
between the traditions practiced by the members of the Nahdhatul 
Ulama and by those of the Shi‘a, such as ziya>rah (make a devotional 
visit to a sacred place), taqli >d in jurisprudence, and honoring the ahlul 
bayt. “The members of the Nahdlatul Ulama are basically practicing 
some of the Shi‘a traditions. It can obviously be seen in its tarekat and 
mystical tradition (Sufism).”56  
While the Indonesian Shi‘a has an Iranian connection in their 
religious traditions, the Indonesian Sunni has a Middle Eastern 
connection, especially with the countries where the ideology of 
Wahhabia overwhelmingly exists such as Saudi Arabia. As to his 
Muslim fellows who condemn the Shi‘a tradition, Abdurrahman Wahid 
points out that Shi‘is activities has made Sunnis anxious about long-
established Sunni tradition and beliefs in the country. They are, 
according to Gus Dur, influenced by Saudi’s Muslim scholars. “I think 
this (campaign against Shi‘a) reflects their anxiety over the Shi‘a. Their 
point of view has been greatly influenced by Saudi Arabia,” 
Abdurrahman Wahid elucidates. “In fact,” he adds, “there is no serious 
problem in Egypt (regarding the Shi‘a). The Shi‘a tradition in Egypt 
has even been considered the fifth School in Islam.”57 Moreover, we 
have to mention clearly in this case that what Abdurrahman Wahid 
means in his statement above has simply dealt with religious point of 
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view of the Sunnis, not their social and political point of view. As I 
have explained previously, since Indonesia is not an Islamic State, the 
government does not interfere in the existence of Shi‘a Islam. 
Indonesian government’s policy therefore differs in essence from the 
Saudi Arabia’s. Fuller and Francke have presented that there are some 
cases that can be categorized as religious, cultural, legal, and economic 
discriminations towards Shi‘a in Saudi Arabia.58 Apart from this, the 
arguments that have been made by Indonesian Sunni> are different 
from the Saudi Wahhabi. The Indonesian Sunni>s, as represented by the 
MUI’s fatwa>s and the recommendations of the seminar, do not see 
Shi‘a as non-believers (kuffa>r), even if there is marked contrast between 
Sunnis and Shi‘is’ teachings. While for Saudi’s Muslim purists, the 
veneration of imam can be considered shirk, Jacob Goldberg in his 
study describes, “the Wahhabi view of the Shi‘is is a logical 
development of the cornerstone of Wahhabi ideology: the doctrine of 
tawh}i >d (the unity of God). Abhorrence of such Shi‘a practices as saint 
worship, shrine and grave cults, and veneration of ima>ms become the 
central tenets of Wahhabism.”59  
The Sunnis’ reaction to Shi‘a Islam can also be seen at a grassroots 
level in particular regions where the Shi‘is directly interact with Sunni>s. 
Ahmad Barakbah, the principal of the Pesantren Al-Hadi, explains that 
when he established his pesantren in Pekalongan, local government and 
people surrounding the given region were unenthusiastic. He was even 
often interrogated by police officers to explain the purpose of his 
pesantren.60 Meanwhile, a similar experience was faced by the Pesantren 
YAPI, a pesantren erected by Husein al-Habshy, a famous Shi‘a cleric in 
Indonesia. In the 1980s, this pesantren made some projects on education 
by collaborating with some other (Sunni) pesantrens in East Java. 
Immediately after other Sunni-based pesantrens recognized that 
Pesantren YAPI belongs to Shi‘a Islam, they (the Sunnis) suspended 
their partnership.61 From the Indonesian Sunnis’ perspective, as 
reflected in the MUI’s fatwas, the recommendation of the above 
                                                     
58 For further discussion see Fuller and Francke, The Arab Shi’ism, pp. 183-186.  
59 Jagob Goldberg, “The Shi‘i Minority in Saudi Arabia,” in Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki 
R. Keddie, Shi’ism and Social Protest (New Haven and London: Yale University, 1986), 
pp. 231-232.  
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61 Ibid.  
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seminar, as well as the reaction performed by Sunnis in some regions, 
the Shi‘a doctrines are considered unsuited to Indonesian religious 
environment. Those claims and opinion basically represent political 
and sociological rivalries. In fact, one issue which has often been raised 
is that the emergence of Shi‘a will hinder social and political stability of 
the country. In a religious point of view, the practice of Shi‘a fiqh such 
as Mut }‘ah marriage and their devotion to ima>m generated a strong 
resistance from the Sunnis. This is thanks to the fact that marriage and 
leadership are parts of the social construction. This assumption is also 
supported by the fact that in a recent National Congress conducted in 
July 2005, the MUI issued 11 fatwa>s, one of which emphasizes that the 
Ahmadiyyah, without mentioning Shi‘a, has deviated from Islam and 
therefore is not a part of Islam; while in 1984, the Ahmadiyyah and 
Shi‘a were classified in the same position. 
Conclusion 
The explanation above leads me to draw some points as my 
conclusion: first, negotiating religious identity can be conducted 
through different ways. In our case, the Shi‘a sympathizers attempt to 
negotiate their identity in a Sunni > majority country by producing a 
bunch of literature as a tool to be culturally recognized by society. 
Following the Iranian Revolution, this effort found its imperative 
meaning for both Shi‘is and those impressed by revolutionary 
movement of Shi‘a Islam. As a sort of popular response to the Iranian 
revolution, this also results in much attention drawn by university 
students who are able to access to literature on Shi‘a Islam. By the early 
1980s, for example, Indonesian Muslims began to have been more 
acquainted with Shi‘a literature and the progressive nature of Shi‘a 
Muslim thinkers and ideologue. However, revolutionary and 
progressive ideas created cannot be easily implemented in the 
Indonesian social and political contexts.  
The next point is that although Shi‘a identity is inseparable from 
their religious faith and active practice, their outward appearance is 
very limited, not as demonstrative as other new Sunni-based religious 
movements. For the Shi‘a sympathizers, being recognized by other 
Muslim fellows and allowed to practice their religious faith in their 
own social circle can be regarded as a moderate achievement they have 
gained. It is also caused by the fact that there is also no agreement 
among them how to express their identity, how to contextualize Shi‘a 
doctrines in the Indonesian context (especially the one that relate to 
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the concept of Islamic leadership), and what kind of active practice 
that Indonesian Muslim mainstream can moderately accept.  
As a consequence of differences in defining how to be an 
Indonesian Shi‘i, the rise of new factions among Shi‘a sympathizers is 
finally unavoidable: some attempt to make much more dialogue with 
other religious community, others seem to be become—to borrow 
Bruinessen’ words—“introversionists”. This then brings me to another 
point: the availability of the public sphere has increasingly prompted 
younger Shi‘a sympathizers to be more openly sharing their ideas with 
others. They have also been able to define their religious standpoint 
within variants of Indonesian Muslims by voicing their own 
perspective on the contested meaning of Islam defined by the “liberal” 
and “literal” Indonesian Muslims. Some Shi‘i activists have so far 
initiated and been involved in various inter-religious dialogue forums. 
This may reduce severe resistance from Sunni purists and at the same 
time led them to being recognized by broader scope of Indonesian 
society. Finally, the recent tension between Shi‘is and Sunnis reflects 
the coagulation of radicalism among Indonesian religious communities 
who overlook the meaning of religious pluralism, under which concept 
the principle of openness, inclusivity and peaceful coexistence 
developed.  
It is also important to note that in the era of transition, the future 
of Indonesian Shi‘is will be contingent upon how Sunni Muslim 
mainstream, represented by MUI and other mass organizations, define 
minority groups and accommodate their interest, and how Shi‘is 
negotiate their identity through their outward appearance.[]  
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